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INTRODUCTION

E

ntering into force in 1970, The
Nonproliferation Treaty’s (NPT) mission is
to end the creation and spread of nuclear
weapons, as well as, promote the use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes (Treaty). Since the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, the
international community has placed regulating
nuclear power as a top priority (Review
Conference). With over 190 party states, five of
which are nuclear weapons states, the NPT
represents one of the only international efforts
towards non-nuclear proliferation and complete
disarmament (Treaty).
The NPT is among the most influential
nuclear arms treaties. In the past 47 years, the NPT
has directed states towards addressing the issue of
nuclear arms, leading to the dismantling of over
50,000 nuclear weapons (Kristensen). However,
the way in which the NPT has shaped the
international community and its system, remains
contested. Since 1970, states have either increased
or decreased their stockpiles, while some have
promised not to acquire weapons at all. Although
the treaty has not changed, its influence on state’s
decisions to arm has. This leads one to question
whether a world free of the threat of nuclear war is
achievable under the NPT.
Some scholars argue that the NPT is the
world’s only hope for avoiding nuclear war, while
others believe the NPT has promoted a
hierarchical system where only certain states have
permission to explore nuclear capabilities. To
understand why countries continue to preserve,
develop, or refrain from using nuclear arms, this

paper will consider the question: How has the NPT
influenced nuclear party, non-nuclear party, and
nuclear non-party states? Why are some states
increasing their stockpiles, and others are not?
Why are nuclear party states refusing to disarm
further? Finally, this paper will consider whether
the NPT prevents countries from pursuing nuclear
weapons, especially when external threats incline
them to do so.

HISTORY

President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for
Peace” proposal initiated international efforts
towards nuclear proliferation (Review
Conference). His call to disarm and dismantle the
nuclear technology used for weaponry, resulted in
the formation of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). Since 1957, the IAEA has
regulated the use of nuclear technology by the
international community via the safeguard systems
(Review Conference). The safeguards ensures that
countries comply with the goals and regulations of
the NPT by passing inspections administered by
the agency (Treaty).
Since the establishment of the NPT, nuclear
weapons have declined from about 70,000 to about
14,000 in 2017 (Kristensen). The majority of the
disarmament is attributed to the proliferation
agreements reached by the international
community (Kristensen). NPT continues to
strengthen its provisions every five years through
considerable review (Review Conference).
However, not every conference means continuous
progress. Several conferences, including those in
1980, 1990, 1995, and 2005, were unable to reach
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POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XIX · 2018

an agreement. Many states remained conflicted
over how much progress the nuclear state parties –
United States, United Kingdom, France, China,
and Russia – were making towards complete
disarmament (Review Conference). This is a
serious concern because the treaty asks parties to
disarm at an “early date” (Duarte 3).
In addition, some states have not committed
to the global efforts toward nuclear proliferation.
For example, countries like Israel, Pakistan, and
India have never signed the NPT; and continue to
possess nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapon
states such as Iraq, Libya, and Iran have also
attempted to obtain nuclear weapons. This violates
the regulations set forth by the treaty and the
IAEA. Also, the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and has
since remained at the center of nuclear
proliferation due to its testing of nuclear missiles
(3). Furthermore, many party states find their
ability to acquire technologies able to produce
fissile materials to be an “inalienable right” (4).
They believe that the safeguards constrain their
ability for peaceful nuclear activities. In addition,
these states find that the constraints are enforced
disproportionately between the non-nuclear state
parties and the nuclear-weapon states (4).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Over the course of the NPT’s existence, various
schools of thought have both analyzed and
interpreted the function of the treaty on the
international community, and its system as a
whole. Exploring the perspectives and
methodologies of realists, liberals, and
constructivists theories on the NPT have led to
various conclusions. Realists argue that the NPT
functions as a tool by dominant states such as the
United States and Russia to preserve their control
over nuclear weaponry, while simultaneously
restricting the ability of other states to this same
control (Petersen 24). Liberals view the NPT as a
tool to protect the world from the potential
destruction nuclear weapons can cause. They also
view the treaty as a means of reshaping the way
leaders view state security and nuclear weaponry
(26). While Constructivists perceive the NPT as a
social construct that establishes order within the
international community (43).

The realist argument that the NPT is a means
for superpowers to exercise their control stems
from fundamental realist beliefs. A core premise in
realist and classical realist theory is that states are
rational actors looking to maximize their selfinterest, which includes maintaining national
security (Nel 27). The history of nuclear weapons,
specifically, has brought about the “security
dilemma.” The “security dilemma” causes
insecurity among states in the international
community (Ikenberry 14). As a state begins to
equip itself with nuclear weaponry, other states
feel insecure and begin to acquire their own
nuclear arms. Evident between the United States
and the Soviet Union, this ultimately leads to
proliferation (14). States like the United States, the
Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom realized
that the spread of nuclear weapons could destroy
the control these superpowers have over their
allies (Tertrais 1). Therefore, international treaties,
like the NPT, are created by the will of these
superpowers, since dismantling nuclear arsenals
would not reflect the rational thinking states
possess (Carranza 493 and Allison 12). Therefore,
the NPT was, and is, intended for these powers to
maintain control over their weapons and prevent
others from acquiring their own (12).
Scholars have concluded that nations,
especially great powers, obtain nuclear weapons
for multiple reasons. One of which involves
nations emulating the weaponry of other nations
as a way to oppose them (Waltz). Another reason
is that nations will build their own arsenals out of
fear that their stronger allies will not protect them
if they face nuclear threats from enemies. This was
the reality in Great Britain when they feared the
United States would not protect them from the
Soviet Union’s threats. Another reason a nation
will acquire nuclear weapons is if their adversaries
also acquire weapons, or out of fear of their future
capabilities. Also, countries find that nuclear
weapons are a cheaper alternative than
conventional arms and can solidify their
international standing (Waltz).
In addition, realist scholar, such as Kenneth
Waltz, even argue that a world where nuclear arms
are available to all will lead to a peaceful world.
Waltz reaches this conclusion by asserting that
states discourage one another from using nuclear
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weapons out of fear of the devastation it will cause
(Waltz). Therefore, if all states have nuclear
capabilities, and deterrence strategies fail, then
these countries will avoid going to war out of fear
of a nuclear catastrophe (Waltz). This is was
evident during the Cold War, when both the
United States and the Soviet Union realized that
going to war meant immeasurable losses on both
sides. Knowledge of nuclear weapons along with
fear enabled both parties to come to a resolution
(Allison 136).
Liberal perspectives on the NPT center around
the core belief that a state’s best interest is to
pursue the common good (Petersen 131). Liberals
argue that the NPT is reducing the proliferation of
nuclear weaponry. In addition, by following the
NPT, states are able to focus on their national
security (131). Since Carr and other liberals believe
that the international community has a moral
obligation to one another, treaties are an effective
form of governance because of the element of
cooperation it requires from all states (147). Evans
and Kawaguchi demonstrate this claim by citing
the 189 member states and South Africa’s
dismantling of their nuclear weapons (78). Since
member states acknowledge “…nuclear weapons
are simply wrong”, the moral aspect of NPT
should not be underestimated (78). Liberals view
the NPT as a rational way for states to ensure their
security by eliminating nuclear weapons.
In addition, liberals argue that economic costs
stopped the United States and the Soviet Union
from going to war. Liberals note that the amount
of money spent on creating nuclear weapons, as
well as, funding delivery vehicles and other
transportation systems is in the billions (128).
Therefore, going to nuclear war is not a rational
decision because of the economic costs invested in
creating and maintaining the weapons.
Furthermore, liberals reference Germany, Japan,
Belarus, South Africa, Ukraine, and other states
that have removed their nuclear weapons or
passed on the opportunity to create nuclear
weapons. These states show that having this
weaponry is not necessary for national security,
nor is it a requirement for rational states, or those
working in their self-interest (129).
Constructivist perspective on the NPT focuses
on the way in which the treaty has formed as a

means for international governance (158).
Constructivism analyzes how ideas and beliefs
shape the way in which states behave, and how
other states react to that behavior (158). Through
documents like the NPT, the international
community is able to create new norms and
standards for itself by reestablishing the
community’s behavior. This occurs when leaders
come together to make decisions and ultimately
define what is and is not acceptable (159). For the
NPT, this occurs every five years at conferences
that discuss the direction of nuclear arms in the
international community. There, new provisions
are drawn, issues are discussed, and resolutions are
made, ultimately, reshaping what the NPT means
to both the international community as a whole,
and the individual member states.
An example of this constructivist concept is
with Egypt’s admission into the NPT. When it
came to nuclear weaponry, Egypt was originally
interested in acquiring its own nuclear technology.
This interest formed from the threat Egypt faced
from Israel’s nuclear activity (Bakanic 18). Egypt
attempted to move forward with nuclear
programs, as well as, appeal to India and the Soviet
Union for assistance; however, these attempts were
unsuccessful. In 1981, Egypt joined the NPT
(Gregory 22). Egyptian leaders agreed that joining
the NPT would mean greater benefits than the
status associated with having nuclear weapons
(Rublee 147). This is evident from the strong USEgypt relations, and the contribution of over $2
billion in aid provided per year (Petersen 161). In
addition, Egypt is able to criticize Israel’s vague
nuclear activity and be a leader in the region. This
shift in Egypt’s ideas and beliefs, from seeking
security and stature via the attempt to acquire
nuclear weaponry, to joining the NPT and
combating Israel, shows how the NPT is able to
alter state’s identity, interests, and behaviors (162).
The stark contrast between each school of
thought illustrates the dividing perspectives on the
NPT’s ability to achieve non-proliferation and
complete disarmament. By analyzing the
methodology, it is evident that the realist approach
relies on the initial formation of the treaty and the
power structure among states, while the liberalist
approach requires a look at today’s involvement
among member states. The constructivist
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perspective has a more fluid interpretation of the
purpose and function of the NPT, which alters as
leaders come together – via international
conferences – to discuss it.

METHODOLOGY

Regardless of how each school of thought analyzes
the NPT, valid arguments are present on each side.
These arguments give way to a better
understanding of the successes and shortfalls of
the treaty. Understanding the influence of the NPT
on the international community requires an
analysis of nuclear party, non-nuclear party, and
nuclear non-party weapon states. This paper will
examine nuclear party states such as the United
States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and
China, and how the NPT has influenced their
decisions to decrease their nuclear stockpiles. It
will also explore how these states maintain their
remaining weapons and the affect this has on the
international community. The following research
will also analyze whether the NPT is a reason for
why non-Nuclear weapon states like Japan and
Brazil, choose not to acquire nuclear weapons.
Lastly, this paper will expand upon the NPT’s
relationship with nuclear non-party states like
Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Within
this point, further analysis will determine whether
the NPT can discourage, or even prevent,
countries facing external threats from acquiring
nuclear weapons.

CASE STUDIES: NUCLEAR - WEAPON
STATE PARTIES

The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state party as a
state that has “manufactured and exploded a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device
prior to January 1, 1967” (Treaty 1968). These
countries include the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, China, and Russia (Review
Conference).
The treaty states that signers of the document
believe there are benefits to the peaceful nuclear
technology that states create, which include the
byproducts that come with nuclear explosive
devices. Therefore, nuclear technology should be
available to all states regardless of whether they are
a nuclear or non-nuclear weapon state party

(Treaty 1968). The NPT requires a number of nonproliferation efforts for nuclear-weapon states.
The treaty prohibits nuclear-weapon state parties
from transferring nuclear weapons and devices, as
well as, control of such items to non-nuclear states.
Article I also prohibits states from encouraging or
assisting non-nuclear weapon states in engineering
such weapons. Article VI of the treaty asks that
each party pursue negotiations, and create an
efficient means to reach nuclear disarmament at
“an early date,” as well as, a treaty on complete
disarmament under international control. In
addition, the NPT requires the votes of all nuclearweapon state parties in order for an amendment to
be approved (Treaty 1968).
Of the 14,930 nuclear warheads remaining,
about 9,400 are in military stockpiles (Kristensen).
More than 3,900 are deployed with operational
forces belonging to British, and French forces,
however, about 93% of these weapons belong to
Russia and the United States. About 1,800 are
ready to launch at a moment’s notice. Although
the number of nuclear weapons has decreased
tremendously since the 1986, (about 55,400
weapons reduction) many argue that the rate at
which these countries are disarming has slowed in
the last 25 years. In addition, all of the nuclear
weapon states appear to be retaining their
remaining stockpiles, and undergoing
modernization programs to revolutionize them
(Kristensen).
The United States, United Kingdom, Russia,
France, and China began creating nuclear weapons
during the Cold War. The United States did so as
an inexpensive and proactive approach to Russian
aggression during that time. Not only did the
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki end WWII,
but it also sent a message to Russia of the United
States capabilities. This sparked Russia’s urgency
to produce their own nuclear weapons, initiating
what scholars call the nuclear arms race. Britain,
France, and China went on to develop their own
nuclear weapons programs as well, refusing to rely
on the U.S. and Russia for security from a nuclear
threat.
By 1986, the world held about 70,300 nuclear
weapons (Kristensen). The creation of the NPT led
to major disarmament among these nations, with a
total reduction of about 55,000 nuclear weapons
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(Kristensen). A majority of this reduction
occurred during the 1990’s when fear of nuclear
war was a major concern (Kristensen). Today’s
reduction rate has slowed significantly with many
leaders refusing to dismantle their nuclear
stockpiles completely. In a 2015 U.S. State
Department report, the U.S. found that Russia
violated The U.S.’s Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty (INF) claiming that they tested a
ground-launched cruise missile (Reif). According
to a NATO report, Russia has also performed
simulated nuclear attacks on NATO allies and
partners, such as Sweden, in March of 2013 (Nato
15). In addition, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin
expressed his perspective on nuclear arms. In
2000, he adopted a military doctrine that allowed
Russia to use nuclear weapons against those who
present “large-scale aggression utilizing
conventional weapons in situations critical to the
national security of the Russian federation”
(Russia’s Military). This is a dramatic change in
Russia’s former policy, which had forbade Russia
from being the first to use nuclear weapons
(Russia’s Military).
President Putin is not the only leader who has
presented such controversial policies. In 1978, the
U.K. policy assured the international community
the country would not use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear state parties,
unless an attack was committed against the U.K.,
its territories, military, or allies, by a non-nuclear
state party with assistance by a nuclear-weapon
state (Kristensen 2011 93). Then in 1995, the U.K.
broadened this policy to include any invasion or
attack on any state that the U.K. possessed a
security commitment with (93). The country’s
Strategic Defense and Security Review in 2010
stated that although the UK faces no threat from
nuclear-states, they could still refer to this policy if
a future threat of attack occurred, leaving room for
potential conflict among the U.K. and non-nuclear
state parties (94).
Policies toward maintaining and using nuclear
weapons are only half the issue. These nuclear
weapon states are also working towards
modernizing their remaining stockpiles as well. In
2010, the U.K. released the number of warheads in
its arsenal to the public by, announcing plans to
shrink its stockpile from 160 to 120 (90). As of

2017, the U.K. still has roughly 215 weapons
(Kristensen). This number encompasses weapons
in military stockpiles, those that are retired, and
those that ‘will be’ dismantled. The U.K.’s
stockpile can arguably be considered the smallest
of the five states (Kristensen 2011 91). However,
the U.K. has also admitted to preserving some of
its nuclear weaponry. In its Strategic Defense and
Security Review (SDSR), the U.K. explained that it
remains focused on renewing its nuclear deterrent
force to protect itself from the current “age of
uncertainty” (Securing Britain). Although the UK
has renounced its biological and chemical weapons
programs from the Cold War, the country still has
a highly developed missile program that continues
to develop (United Kingdom).
The U.K. has also joined forces with France, in
terms of security and defense (Kristensen 2011 93).
Through bilateral treaties, these countries are
working to maintain and develop their respective
nuclear arsenals (93). The French government is
not, as of yet, planning a future reduction of their
nuclear weapons (Kristensen, 2015 30). The
country spends approximately 3.6-4.6 billion U.S.
dollars annually on nuclear forces (Acheson). The
French President Francois Hollande announced
that 12.3% of that budget would specifically fund
nuclear weapon modernization (France Nuclear).
This includes modernizing submarines, aircrafts,
warheads, and nuclear facilities (Kristensen 2015
30). Hollande plans to continue this funding until
2019 (France Nuclear). In addition, France is also
looking into the study of next generation
weaponry (Kristensen 2015 30). The country’s
interest in maintaining their current nuclear
weapons arsenal, while simultaneously
modernizing such technology, dramatically
contrasts with the obligations imposed by the NPT
to dismantle nuclear weaponry.
What began in 1970 as a major motivator for
these superpowers to disarm is now forgotten.
After decades of disarmament, the superpowers
are now slowing their reduction, and
simultaneously modernizing their stockpiles. The
reason for this is twofold. First, relations today
between countries are similar to that of the Cold
War. Today, U.S.-Russia relations have reached
serious lows comparable to that of the 1940s. This
is a result of U.S.-Russia aggressions towards each
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other from nuclear weapons disputes, the Syria
crisis, U.S. allegations of Russian election hacking
and more. Both the U.S. and Russia do not trust
each other, in fact, officials in the Russian Defense
Ministry have admitted that the Obama
Administration’s pursuit of a world free of nuclear
weapons is really an attempt to dominate with
conventional weapons (Shuster). The five
superpowers are working to maintain what is left
of their stockpiles because they are certain that
others are doing the same.
The second reason for the superpowers slowed
dismantlement and simultaneous modernization is
that the NPT does not discuss modernization.
Although Article VI of the treaty requires the U.S.,
the U.K., Russia, France, and China to work
towards the dismantlement of stockpiles and
“pursue negotiations in good faith” at an “early
date,” there are no limitations in terms of
modernizing weapons (Treaty 1968) (Kristensen
2014 106-107). In the 2015 review conference,
many non-nuclear state parties pointed to the
nuclear state’s expensive and counterproductive
modernization programs, nuclear policies, and
slow disarmament pace, as evidence for concerns
of serious penalties (Arms Control Experts).
However, the vagueness of the NPT, as well as, the
persistence of nuclear parties to follow through
with such programs, has led to disputes and an
inability to update a plan for action (Arms Control
Experts).
The NPT originally functioned as a means to
de-escalate tensions caused by the Cold War.
These countries were fearful of the mutually
assured destruction that would come from a
nuclear war. The NPT was a way for these powers
to reduce their stockpiles with assurance that other
nuclear-armed countries were doing the same.
However, now the intention to maintain nuclear
stockpiles, regardless of NPT obligations, has
resulted in its preservation by all five-weapon
states. As Waltz describes, countries will acquire
nuclear weapons in retaliation of other countries
that have acquired them, as evidenced by Russia
and the U.S. (Waltz). Countries will also equip
themselves out of fear of uncertainty and, refusing
to rely on other states like Britain, China, and
France, for protection.

CASE STUDIES: NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE PARTIES

Party states that signed the NPT and have not
manufactured or exploded a nuclear weapon
device prior to January 1, 1967 are called nonnuclear weapon state parties. There are over 180
non-nuclear weapon state parties, all of which are
located in various regions around the world
(Treaty). In accordance with the NPT, these
parties cannot receive or have control over nuclear
weapons and similar explosive devices (Treaty
1968). These states cannot seek or receive
assistance to produce weapons. In addition, each
non-nuclear weapon state party is to accept the
safeguards negotiated with the IAEA, in order to
remain in compliance with the NPT’s
requirements, and to remain within the bounds of
peaceful nuclear activity (Treaty 1968). However,
many non-nuclear state parties are capable of
acquiring nuclear weapons. For example, Brazil
and Japan have the technological and economic
resources to do so; however, they have chosen not
to acquire these weapons. Whether this is a result
of obligations imposed on them by the NPT, is
worth consideration.
Brazil’s nuclear program first began in the
1930’s (Brazil’s Nuclear). Motivated by the military
regimes that dominated Brazil between 1964 and
1985, the programs primarily focused on uranium
enrichment (Brazil’s Nuclear). Eventually every
branch of Brazil’s military had their own nuclear
weapons program (Marvin). Their pursuit of
nuclear weapons was due to a longstanding rivalry
between Brazil and Argentina (Brazil’s Nuclear).
Their ambitions toward regional influence and
recognition within the international community is
what ignited the contention. In 1967, Brazil signed
the Treaty of Tlatelolco making Latin America a
nuclear free zone. However, limitations in nuclear
activity were not set forth until 1988 when Brazil
approved a new constitution restricting their use
of nuclear activities to peaceful purposes only.
Overtime, the competition between both Brazil
and Argentina diminished because of
democratization. Eventually, the two states signed
an agreement pledging to maintain peaceful
nuclear activities. In 1998, Brazil became a party
of the NPT; however, the country’s participation
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in the treaty occurred much later due to hesitation
from Brazil’s leaders. They believed the NPT was a
means for foreign forces to control and hinder
Brazil’s nuclear objectives. Leaders like President
Lula Da Silva believed signing the treaty would be
detrimental, especially considering the possibility
of conflict between Brazil and a nuclear power
(Brazil’s Nuclear).
Since their signing of the NPT, Brazil’s nuclear
weapons programs has ended. Their current goal
is to reach self-sufficiency in selling nuclear fuel to
the international market (Brazil’s Nuclear). Today,
Brazil has the most advanced nuclear facilities in
Latin America, and works to uphold nuclear
weapon states to their nuclear disarmament
obligations set forth by the NPT (Country
Profiles). Although Brazil appears to have shifted
from critic to advocate of the NPT, the real
motivator behind Brazil’s refusal to acquire
nuclear weapons is that it does not have a reason
to. Unlike nuclear weapon states, such as the U.S.
and Russia, or nuclear non-party states, such as
Pakistan and India, Brazil does not face a serious
security dilemma (Marvin). Brazil’s push for
nuclear weapons in the 1930’s was a result of the
tense relations and rivalry with Argentina. Brazil
along with Argentina and Chile have already had
their own nuclear arms race. However, similar to
the allies and Russia, the fear of mutually assured
destruction pushed them towards disarmament.
The democratization of the countries helped to
diffuse the tension between Brazil and Argentina,
as well as, the Treaty of Tlateloco provided an
“out” that was preferable to the NPT at the time
(Marvin). Today, Brazil does not face serious
threats to its security. Regardless of its ability to
obtain nuclear weaponry, it is the low security
threat that inclines Brazil to avoid arming itself
and not the NPT.
Another non-nuclear weapon state with the
intelligence and financial resources to possess
nuclear weapons is Japan. Japan’s non-nuclear
policy stance derives from its devastating history
in the Cold War, specifically the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki bombings (Japan). The country has
never developed a complete nuclear weapons
program; rather, it has implemented anti-nuclear
weapons policies. These policies restrict Japan’s
use of nuclear activity to peaceful purposes, and

forbids the manufacturing, possession, or
transportation of nuclear weapons in Japan. The
country became an official signatory of the NPT in
1968. Similar to Brazil, Japanese leaders had their
reservations towards the NPT. Leaders were deeply
concerned that it would hinder the country from
achieving national energy needs through nuclear
technology. Others worried it would be
detrimental to Japan’s security in the future
(Japan).
Since its signing, Japan has remained a leader
in the fight towards a nuclear-free world. In fact,
the country has reached out to non-nuclear
weapon states like Canada, Mexico, the United
Arab Emirates, and Poland, to advance nuclear
disarmament and nonproliferation efforts (Japan).
Even the country’s public, shares serious antinuclear weapons attitudes. Nevertheless, the
country has undergone recent nuclearization
debates primarily fueled by the tensions in the
Korean peninsula (Japan). In October 2006, North
Korea conducted a nuclear weapons test, which
caused many of Japan’s top officials to question
the idea of a Japanese nuclear arsenal (Hughes).
Officials argued that Japan is constitutionally
entitled to possess nuclear weapons for the
exclusive purpose of self-defense (Hughes).
Nonetheless, many scholars argue that Japan is too
invested in its commitment to nonproliferation to
begin developing nuclear weapons (Japan).
Whether or not the NPT will continue to hold
Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons is
debatable. Although Japan is consistent in its antinuclear weapons stance, one can argue that this
stance is the result of Japan’s low-level security
threats, and were it to have a threat to security,
may alter this stance. Over the years, the Japanese
government has maintained a relaxed response to
events many would find concerning like China’s
nuclear test in 1964, the Soviet Union during the
Cold War, and North Korea’s nuclear efforts today
(Hughes). Japan is able to maintain this
composure, especially with North Korea, because
it does not find the security threat to be high. The
Japanese government believes that North Korea
would require more time, beyond their first test, to
develop the nuclear weapons they desired. This
leaves more time for the Japanese to pursue
diplomatic negotiations. Secondly, the Japan’s
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initial response to North Korean nuclear threats
would be an acceleration in their ballistic defense
systems (Hughes). Further, Japan’s reliance on the
U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is also a major
reason for their relaxed approach (Japan). Their
reliance began in 2013 when Japan created a
national security strategy against North Korea.
This strategy primarily consists of Japan’s ballistic
missile defense and increased cooperation in
extended deterrence with the U.S. This
commitment has ensured Japan’s security making
it easier for Japan to worry less about nuclear
threats, and more on nonproliferation (Japan).
In addition, the security risks from Japan’s
pursuit of nuclear weapons will far outweigh the
benefits. While Japan may be able to protect itself
by working towards nuclear capabilities, their
possession of nuclear weapons can potentially
cause an arms race between Japan, China, and
North Korea (Hughes). This security dilemma is
not in the interest of the Japanese or the U.S., and
any potential for the U.S. to not provide deterrence
after Japan’s nuclear weapon possession, would be
detrimental to Japan’s security. Although Japan is
among those on the forefront of progressive
nonproliferation efforts as outlined by the NPT, its
decision to abide by it is ultimately a result of its
lack of national security threats. If the threat posed
by North Korea reached a state of serious concern
to Japan, it will welcome U.S. nuclear arms into
the country as it did in Okinawa in 1969 (Japan).

CASE STUDIES: NUCLEAR NON-PARTY
STATES

Nuclear non-party states are those that have not
signed the NPT and pursue nuclear weapons.
These countries are comprised of Israel, India, and
Pakistan. North Korea also falls in this category, as
it was originally a signer; however, it has since
opted to possess nuclear weapons, therefore
violating the treaty. Each of these countries began
their nuclear weapons programs within a decade
of each other. Israel is the first country in the
Middle East to possess nuclear weapons (Israel
Nuclear). Beginning its pursuit in the 1950s, Israel
sought nuclear weaponry as a means to ease the
threat posed by its neighbors. In addition, the
U.S.’s “abandonment” of Israel during the Suez

Canal, solidified Israel’s pursuit of a self-sustained
nuclear deterrence. Maintaining a sense of secrecy,
there it is unknown the exact size of Israel’s
nuclear weapons. Experts agree that the weapons
do exist; however, specifics on the country’s
biological and chemical weapons programs are
unknown. Although Israel is not a signer of the
NPT, the country maintains that it is interested in
a nuclear-free Middle East, with the caveat that
comprehensive peace is essential before such talks
can occur (Israel Nuclear).
India’s exploration of nuclear weapons began
in the 1940s with an actual program developed in
the 1960s (India). From 1997 to 2009, the country
also had a chemical weapons program. After
completing five tests in 1998, the country declared
itself a nuclear weapon state. In 2005, the U.S.
collaborated with India allowing them into the
international nuclear market as long as they
abided by specific safeguards. As of 2015, India’s
nuclear arsenal consisted of 90 to 110 warheads.
India remains a non-signer of the NPT for
multiple reasons. For one, India’s leaders believe
the NPT maintains an unfair distinction between
the nuclear weapon states and the rest of the
world. The treaty allows these states to possess
nuclear weapons while enforcing strict restrictions
on non-nuclear states. In addition, India is highly
critical of the nuclear-weapon state’s disarmament
efforts. Since the NPT’s inception, the nuclear
weapon states have yet to achieve the obligations
set forth in Article IV of the treaty (India).
Pakistan began its nuclear weapons programs
in the 1970s following the Indo-Pakistani War
(Pakistan). Such efforts were motivated by
Pakistan’s desire to curb the conventional
inferiority against India. Following India’s tests,
Pakistan began its own trials specifically focusing
on uranium enrichment. Eventually, the country
declared itself a nuclear weapon state. Since then,
Pakistan refuses to sign the NPT in addition to a
majority of other anti-nuclear arms treaties
(Pakistan).
North Korea has pushed for its own nuclear
weapons program since the end of WWII (North
Korea). Advancements toward nuclear weaponry
increased after North Korea announced its
withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. The country
justified this move by citing U.S. aggressions and
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the Bush administration’s pre-emption doctrine,
as declarations of war (Pollack). Efforts by the
international community to reduce North Korea’s
stockpile have been unsuccessful. In 2013, North
Korea along with South Korea, Japan, China,
Russia, and the U.S. held talks aimed to
denuclearize the Korean peninsula (North Korea).
However, after disputes with the U.S. over a North
Korean rocket launch, the government voided the
discussion and proceeded to conduct nuclear tests.
Today, the country has an active nuclear weapons
program, and it is believed to possess both a
biological and chemical weapons program. State
media has also announced that all nuclear facilities
were functioning to improve the country’s nuclear
stockpile.
Israel, India, and Pakistan, and North Korea’s
nuclear history is a prime example of how external
threats incline countries to adopt nuclear
weaponry. The regional tensions and differences in
military strength pose a serious security issue.
These states refuse to rely on nuclear weapon
states for protection. Nuclear nonparty states do
not trust the NPT because they do not see all state
actors in compliance with disarmament. These
countries cannot be sure that nuclear weapon
states will protect them, nor that they will comply
with the disarmament efforts. Therefore, these
countries would rather equip themselves with
nuclear arms and stabilize their security, as
opposed to being party to a treaty that infringes on
their right to protection.

ANALYSIS

After analyzing nuclear party, non-nuclear party,
and nuclear non-party states, it is clear that the
NPT influences each differently. Initially, the NPT
was a way for states to address heightened tensions
by disarming their nuclear stockpiles. Since then,
the NPT has led to significant reductions in the
world’s nuclear inventory, as well as, a joint effort
from nations across the globe to refrain from
nuclear use. However, overtime the NPT’s power
over states has diminished.
Nuclear weapon states like Russia have
ignored the NPT and openly admitted to
preserving stockpiles, while simultaneously
supporting their country’s modernization
programs. Super powers like France and Great

Britain have emphasized their right to use nuclear
force in the case of an invasion, attack, or
aggression, leaving opportunity for nuclear use
against others in the international community.
Again, this contradicts the NPT’s function within
the global system. Nonetheless, the nuclear powers
continue to pursue these loopholes, which
essentially undoes the progress made since the
Cold War.
The NPT’s influence on non-nuclear weapon
states is also diminishing. The reality is nonnuclear weapon states are only abiding by the
treaty because they are not facing a current
security threat. States like Brazil and Japan do not
have tense relations like that of the U.S. and
Russia, making their pursuit of nuclear weapons
rather pointless. In addition, some non-nuclear
weapon states like Japan have ensured nuclear
protection from the U.S. in the case of future
security threats. This has also kept them from
addressing a nuclear option. They are abiding by
the NPT because they have ensured their nuclear
protection by other means, i.e countries who
already possess nuclear weaponry.
Nuclear non-party states are continuing their
weapons programs with little consideration of the
NPT. Israel, Pakistan, India, and now North Korea
continue to explore nuclear capabilities in the
name of national security. These countries have
expressed opposition to the NPT believing that its
sole function is to restrict their ability to protect
themselves. India and other non-nuclear party
states have criticized the NPT for not holding
nuclear weapon states accountable to their
obligations under the provision of the NPT.
Overall, the NPT’s influence is not pertinent to a
non-party states decision to pursue nuclear
weapons.
There are multiple reasons for why states
increase their stockpiles. However, the driving
force in their decision-making process is national
security. States will ultimately decide on whether
or not to pursue nuclear weapons, based on if they
currently face a security threat. Countries that
undergo their own “cold war tensions” will arm
themselves with nuclear weapons as an attempt to
even the playing field and secure their countries
safety. As evidenced by the efforts of states like
Israel, India, and Pakistan.
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Countries that have not acquired a nuclear
stockpile, like Brazil and Japan, do so because their
current state of security does not dictate the need
for nuclear weaponry. Brazil armed itself with
nuclear weapons after its “cold war tensions” with
Argentina. The two participated in their own arms
race, which made securing a stockpile critical.
However, since their signing of the Treaty of
Tlateloco and the NPT, tensions between Brazil
and Argentina have decreased significantly. The
country no longer faces a security threat and no
longer feels the need to arm itself with nuclear
weapons.
However, that is not to say that Brazil or other
non-nuclear weapon states will never consider
nuclear weapons. If there is a national security
threat, these states will consider a nuclear option,
just as other’s have done in the past. This reality is
present with Japan. Though the country has had a
devastating experience with nuclear weapons, and
has remained at the forefront of nonproliferation
efforts, Japan still ensures its security from North
Korea by relying on the U.S. extended nuclear
deterrence. The lack of security threats along with
this safety guarantee by the U.S. are the only
reasons why Japan will not pursue a nuclear
program today.
Similar to nuclear weapon non-party states
and non-nuclear weapon party states, countries
like the U.S., the U.K., France, Russia, and China
refuse to disarm because of their national security.
Initially, the NPT functioned as a means to lessen
tensions during the Cold War and push for the
elimination of the world’s nuclear stockpile.
However, today tense relations have resurfaced.
The U.S.-Russia relationship has declined
tremendously. For Russia to compete with the
U.S.’s conventional weapons, it must maintain
whatever is left of its nuclear arsenal. Curbing this
gap helps secure Russia’s security against the U.S.
Since Russia has openly admitted to preserving its
remaining stockpile, other nations – the U.S., the
U.K., France, and China – will follow suit. The
U.S. will maintain and modernize its nuclear
weapons because of the threat Russia poses to U.S.
security. The U.K., France, and China will do the
same to avoid relying on the U.S. and Russia for
protection. These nations have placed their
security before fulfilling their NPT obligations,

and in doing so have undone the majority of the
NPT’s progress since the Cold War. Now the
world faces the reality of having a smaller amount
of nuclear weapons that can cause larger amounts
of damage.
Whether the NPT can prevent countries from
pursuing these nuclear weapons, especially when
external threats incline them to do so, is debatable.
However, the research implies that it is not likely.
Regardless of which countries are in dispute, as
long as that nation’s security is threatened, nuclear
weapons will remain an option. Countries will not
withhold themselves from nuclear weapons if the
rest of the international community is working
towards them. As long as countries feel threatened,
nuclear weapons will remain a legitimate option
for stability, which surpasses their obligations or
commitments to the NPT. Countries like Pakistan,
India, and North Korea will ignore the
international community’s call for a nuclear-free
world to ensure they are protected from the
regional threats they face. States like Japan will
comply with the NPT as long as they are promised
nuclear security by other states like the U.S.,
otherwise they may explore a nuclear option.
Lastly, countries like the U.S. and Russia will
continue to maintain and modernize existing
stockpiles out of fear of security and argue that
modernization does not outright violate the NPT.
This ultimately leads one to question whether
a world free of nuclear arms is achievable under
the NPT. Although the international community
had intentions to reduce and completely dissolve
the world of nuclear weapons, it is apparent now
that the treaty no longer has the same power on
states. The NPT does not provide effective
solutions for the reasons why countries pursue and
preserve nuclear arms in the first place. At the time
of its creation, writers of the NPT did not foresee
modernization as an option for states. The goal
was to reduce U.S.-Soviet Union tensions and
push for total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Since the NPT does not address modernization,
states can continue to do so while arguing that it
does not violate the NPT. In addition, the NPT
lacks specificity in its obligations. The NPT
requires nuclear weapon states to disarm at an
“early date,” giving these countries room to argue
for as much time as they please. These major issues
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within the treaty have fueled disputes among the
international community. Many non-nuclear party
states are growing frustrated with the lack of
commitment exhibited by nuclear party states.
Instead of dismantling stockpiles further, these
states are advancing their weaponry, which will
only ignite tensions among other states. The rising
tensions will ultimately lead to more countries
pursuing nuclear weapons programs and decrease
the number of countries willing to follow the
guidelines and goals of the NPT.

CONCLUSION

The reality of the NPT and its influence on the
international community remains consistent with
the realist perspective. The realist perspective on
the NPT relies on the fact that states will always
prioritize their security, since doing so reflects the
rational behavior of states. Nuclear weapon states
have not only admitted to preserving their existing
stockpiles, but also to making them more
dangerous. This is all in the name of security,
which is what realist theory highlights. Realists
also argue that states will never completely disarm
because doing so is irrational. This is evident in the
nuclear weapons states inability to disarm further
than they already have. These states want to
maintain some level of competitive warfare to
ensure their existence against rivaling states.
Realist perspective argues that the NPT has
created a hierarchical system where some states
have permission to explore their nuclear
capabilities, while restricting access to this
technology for others. States have contended the
imbalance in regulating nuclear weapon states.
Nuclear weapon states are able to continue such
programs whilst the international community
debates over the legitimacy of such actions under
the NPT. Regardless of the obvious contradiction
in the actions of nuclear weapon states and the
NPT, the U.S., Russia, U.K., France, and China
continue to preserve and modernize stockpiles.
The Liberal perspective argues that the NPT
will work because countries are looking to avoid
nuclear war. They contend that avoiding nuclear
war falls in line with maintaining national security
and therefore is in their best interest. While the
Constructivists argue that, the NPT’s influence
ultimately depends on how state actors give

meaning to it. However, these approaches requires
all states to comply with the obligations set forth in
the NPT. Otherwise if one state opts for a nuclear
program, other countries, especially those that find
the nuclear state a threat, will push for their own
program.
Today, the international community is
composed of states all interested in maintaining
self-existence. States have neglected their
responsibilities to the NPT for the sake of
maintaining national security. States that do
comply with the NPT, only do so because they do
not yet have a national security threat, which
would result in their needing to invest in nuclear
warfare. However, given certain circumstances
these countries are not compelled by the NPT to
consider non-nuclear options. This security-driven
focus aligns with the realist theory, further
illustrating this school of thought as the most
accurate in addressing the function and
effectiveness of the NPT on the international
community.
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